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How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever Achieve?

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter et al. · 2021
PhilArchive · Papers · 2021
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philosophy
Philosophers often argue about whether fetuses, animals, or AI systems do or do not have moral status. We will suggest instead that different entities have different degrees of moral status with respect to different moral reasons in different circumstances for different purposes. Recognizing this variability of moral status will help to resolve some but not all debates about the potential moral status of AI systems in particular.
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