The Problem with Evaluating the Comparative Prudential Value of Procreation Asymmetrically

It is widely held that there is a fundamental asymmetry in the ethics of procreation: We are obliged not to create unhappy people, but we are not obliged to create happy people. I argue that, contrary to a thesis popularized by David Benatar, this cannot be explained by appeal to an axiological asymmetry in comparative prudential value. All natural ways to spell out the metaphysical foundations of an asymmetric account of comparative prudential value fail. Further, such an account is incompatible with the plausible assumption that comparative value supervenes on intrinsic value and leads to well-known intransitivity problems. Finally, I present a novel argument that shows that asymmetric accounts of comparative value allow for malignant chain reactions and the possibility of justifiedly discounting interests of future generations. These arguments against the axiological Asymmetry Thesis set adequacy conditions for any theory of comparative values and any explanation of the ethical asymmetry thesis.