Coercion as an Excuse

Coercion wrongs its victim, invalidates their exercises of normative power and transfers responsibility for their compliance to the coercer. The paper considers two theories of the normative significance of coercion. On a familiar account, one defended by writers such as Hart and Scanlon, coercion wrongs the coerced by depriving them of an option to which they are entitled and does so in a way which justifies their compliance, thereby transferring responsibility to the coercer. I argue that justification and excuse modify responsibility for action in rather different ways, the latter essentially involving the operation of emotions like fear and anger. I then offer an excusatory model of coercion (based on fear) which locates the wrong of coercion in how it transfers responsibility for compliance to the coercer without justifying the compliance of the coerced. In the final section, it is argued that the standards of culpability which specify and assign excuses are conventional, embodying socially recognised ideals of executive virtue.