Ontological and Metaontological implications of Wittgenstein's Antirealism

In this paper, I will argue that, in addition to establishing an intellectual tradition, the founder of the philosophy of language also laid the foundations of an ontology. Accordingly, I will attempt to apply Carnap's criterion of ontological commitment ‒ along with the conventionalism that follows from it ‒ to Frege's views. This will require outlining the development of the relevant tradition, from its beginnings in the works of Frege and Russell to the insights of Wittgenstein, which I consider decisive in relation to the criterion of ontological commitment that I intend to apply to Frege's theses. In other words, I aim to show not only that Wittgenstein was the central figure in introducing meta-ontological reflection into the philosophy of language, but also that he is ‒ retrospectively ‒ directly responsible for the internal structure, namely the methodological dualism, of Carnap's linguistic conventionalism, which I apply to Frege's position.