An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn’t the content NCC

Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the content NCC for vision, i.e., it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine what it is that we visually experience (e.g., whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this “upper-deck” form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: On the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object shape or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g., attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which “ensemble statistics” are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I’ll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.