PhilArchive
open access
Concrete Entities and Non-Concrete Entities in Cognition
Seems plausible to accept the thesis that “it is not objects per se that have a special status in the mind of the child”. I grasp this thesis in the sense that the only stuff that infants can individuate are not objects, but this not implies that objects do not make the core contribution to our (adult) metaphysical conceptual scheme, i.e. to constitute a platform for basic adaptive environmental performances in adult life. Plausibly, any young human cognitive system needs to stabilize capacities to track holes and shadows since these non concrete entities could be indispensable in a world perceived as populated with objects.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Plain Paritculars#750397
- Affordances and the Contents of Perception#82431
- The Emergence of a Distinction between Things and Stuff#1092181
- The Emergence of a Distinction between Things and Stuff#1092138
- The Totality Thesis: A Developmental Framework for Consciousness Through Discord, Overflow, and Coherence#102142
Record · ID 707993
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive