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On the epistemology of the precautionary principle
In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by the de minimis principle.
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