On Heidegger's Concept of Freedom: Dasein's Essence and the Determinism of Technology

The paper argues that Feenberg‘s critique of Heidegger is rather erroneous. Against his accusation that Heidegger is determinist, the Dasein rather exemplifies a radical freedom from technology‘s enframing. Dasein holds a freedom as it has the capacity to be free, not only from the technological devices and attitudes, but also from the ontology of enframing, which is founded to what Heidegger historically described as forgetfulness of Being, where Being is treated only as entities or beings. Feenberg rather misreads Heidegger‘s essence of technology as only at the ontic level but not as an ontological problem. Such misreading is based on Feenberg‘s neglect to elaborate Dasein‘s role in the ontological constitution, or in the concealment and unconcealment of Being. With such neglect of Dasein, the technology is perceived as entities totally outside of human control. The Gelassenheit becomes a surrendering to the danger of technology, and not as Dasein‘s act of opening to the clearing for the unconcealment of Being.