Consciousness as This Presence, Here and Now: The Meaning of Defining Consciousness

Consciousness is reinterpreted in this study not as a concept to be explained but as a performative event of presence through which it reveals itself. Many traditional approaches—whether in neuroscience, cognitive science, or phenomenology—have tended to define consciousness from an external, third-person perspective, often objectifying and thereby obscuring its living immediacy. In response, this paper proposes a new first-person definition: Consciousness is this very presence, here and now. This definition is not a propositional statement but a phenomenological act that allows consciousness to manifest itself. By analyzing the epistemological, ontological, and linguistic dimensions of this performative definition, the study shows that consciousness is not an object of explanation but the field in which explanation itself occurs. Drawing upon Husserl, Heidegger, and Henry as well as the performative insights of Austin and the direct awareness of Zen Buddhism, the paper articulates a substantive middle way between explanatory reductionism and mystical idealism. Ultimately, the act of defining consciousness can be understood as an awakening to presence itself—a philosophical practice in which definition and manifestation converge.