The Nash Equilibrium Puzzle in Public Administration: From Suboptimal Outcomes to Systemic Equilibrium Traps

Nash Equilibrium introduces a persistent theoretical anomaly within public administration research. Although scholars frequently deploy it as an analytical instrument to clarify entrenched, suboptimal administrative outcomes, applying these models prescriptively during policy formulation frequently yields limited success. The present investigation examines the mechanics underlying this discrepancy. Drawing upon a systematic synthesis of existing literature, the analysis suggests that such a disconnect likely originates from the highly restrictive premises of classical game theory, which generally omit the behavioral and evolutionary variables inherent in public sector operations. In an effort to address these theoretical limitations, a consolidated conceptual model termed "Systemic Equilibrium Traps" is proposed. Within this context, a trap is operationalized as a self-perpetuating, deficient condition maintained by the convergence of three intersecting strata. These include the formal Institutional Game regulating structural incentives, the Cognitive-Social Filter encompassing the heuristic norms guiding actor interpretation, and the Evolutionary Path dictating systemic resilience through learned dependencies. This multidimensional approach appears to provide a more nuanced mechanism for diagnosing persistent policy failures, thereby establishing a foundation for multi-tiered interventions directed at systemic dynamics and cognitive frameworks alongside traditional regulatory incentives.