Nominal and Real Concepts. On the Relation Between Words, Concepts, and Conceptions in Kant and Contemporary Philosophy

This chapter examines the relationship between language and thought in Kant and contemporary philosophy. It argues that Kant, despite his substantive contributions to the philosophy of language, would not have followed the linguistic turn in philosophy. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, the sharp distinction between words and concepts, as well as between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ concepts; secondly, the view that philosophical inquiries are genuinely directed at ‘concepts of things’ rather than at ‘concepts of words.’ The first section analyses the word-concept distinction in Kant. The following section examines the conflation of words and concepts in both everyday and professional philosophical language, as well as Kant’s possible response. The next part is dedicated to the problem of conceptual and topical discontinuity as well as the distinction between words, concepts, and conceptions from both contemporary and Kantian points of view. Finally, the concluding section offers an alternative perspective on the significance of words and continuity in philosophy.