PhilArchive
open access
Las raíces kantianas de la autonomía personal en el pensamiento de Rawls
Rawls acknowledges the analogy between his conception of the moral personality and the thought of Kant. However, many philosophers have discussed that similarity. This article aims to evaluate the Kantian foundation of Rawlsian liberty. Specifically, it assesses the idea of personal autonomy. The conclusion is that certain interpretation of Kant, which incorporates both his thinkings on the moral law and on happiness as an intrinsic purpose of the human being, allows the acknowledgement of the aforementioned analogy, and thus enables a better understanding of the Rawlsian idea of freedom.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Kant and Existentialism: Inescapable Freedom and Self-Deception#704253
- Kant and Feder on the Will, Happiness, and the Aim of Moral Philosophy#709258
- Determinism and Human Freedom in Kant's Critical Philosophy#691447
- Kant’s Transcendental Theory of Moral Psychology Within Sellars’ Manifest Image#729019
- Book Review - Happiness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: Morality, Indirect Duties, and Welfare Rights by Alice Pinheiro Walla#96696
Record · ID 712814
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive