A ideia de uma Neurofilosofia do Brasil

Neurophilosophy of Brazil can be described as a bridge, built with the help of issues related to freedom and to the cognitive process of thinking, between Neurophilosophy and “Philosophy of Brazil”. In order to formulate this idea, initially, a critical analysis of “Neurophilosophie der Willensfreiheit”, from Henrik Walter, is going to executed by passing through two great milestones, namely the three components model from Seebass and minimal neurophilosophy, toward the central thesis that there is a unity of communication between different solutions to the issue of freedom of the will and the most various neurophilosophies. In the second section, a critique is going to be done against that thesis with the help of mutually contradictive uses of the term ‘thought’, which confer this concept vagueness and, therefore, lack of conceptual unity. Consequently, the importance of conceptual unity for the unity of neurophilosophy of freedom of will in itself is determined, since the three components model, together with minimal neurophilosophy, allows this communication: Without conceptual unity of thought, there is no unity to the neurophilosophy of freedom of will. Lastly, in the third section, a revisionist proposal of the concept of thought, through the convergence of studies in schizophrenia, healthy individuals and analytical philosophy is going to be briefly discussed, besides the direct consequences of this investigation to the analysis of Brazilian freedom of thought, which seems to be the core of the problematics concerning “Philosophy of Brazil”, in dialogue with some central ideas from Miroslav Milovic.