Pode uma crença imoral ser epistemicamente racional?

Among the many ways to evaluate the rationality and adequacy of belief, the relationship between two dimensions is of particular interest: the epistemic dimension and the moral dimension. A belief is epistemically rational when it is supported by the evidence and it is morally adequate when its formation and holding are sensitive to moral features of the situation. According to the traditional view, known as purism, the moral domain does not directly impact the epistemic domain. However, there is debate in the literature about the existence of immoral beliefs that seem, at first sight, epistemically rational. These beliefs that contain apparent normative conflict raise the challenge of explaining how different forms of normativity are related. Non-traditional theories hold that there is an encroachment of moral factors in epistemic rationality. Moral encroachment is the view that moral features can affect the epistemic status of a belief, for example, influencing the threshold of sufficient evidence for rational belief. This idea produces a natural answer to the conflict problem: it wouldn’t exist because moral contexts make immoral beliefs also epistemically irrational. In this paper, I’ll argue that immoral beliefs can’t be epistemically rational, so there is no conflict. This, however, is not due to moral encroachment. It happens because immoral beliefs are never actually supported by the evidence. They are immoral because they are insensitive to moral contexts and epistemically irrational because they are insensitive to available evidence. This account is compatible with purism and, since it is the most parsimonious theory, we should adopt purism.