Epistemic minimax and related principles in the contemporary epistemic environment

In this chapter, we explore the prospects of epistemic minimax and related principles. Minimax is a well-known approach to choosing a strategy under conditions of risk and uncertainty. In individual cases, the minimax strategy selects the action that can lead to the least bad outcome for the agent, even if taking that action ensures that expected utility is not maximized and that best-case outcomes are impossible. In social cases, the minimax strategy selects the policy that maximizes the wellbeing of the least-well-off members of the group, even if doing so ensures that the aggregate utility of the group is not maximized and that best-case social outcomes are impossible. While there are many criticisms of minimax at both the individual and the social level, it is a prominent and popular approach at the social level because it prioritizes those at the bottom of the ladder. This chapter focuses on the social case for epistemic minimax and related principles. We develop the notions of epistemic position and epistemic power, both of which are prima facie epistemic goods, and demonstrate that a minimax principle can come apart from principles that would promote aggregate or maximum epistemic position or power. We also point to empirical and computational work that shows that testimonial networks online tend to be characterized by extreme inequalities of epistemic power. Then we extend traditional arguments in favor of social minimax to show that they hold in the epistemic case as well. In light of these arguments, we contend that the epistemic minimax principle should be treated as a heuristic for network interventions in democratic communities, and that it may be attractive for other types of communities as well. We conclude by examining the idea that some communities—especially the scientific community—should probably adopt different principles. Communities vary along different dimensions, and these dimensions may favor or disfavor different epistemic policies and principles, showing the sensitivity of our arguments to particular circumstances.