Rights, Redistribution, and the Limits of Justice in Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory

This article reconstructs and critically evaluates Robert Nozick’s libertarian theory of justice as articulated in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Focusing on Nozick’s conception of rights as side-constraints and his entitlement theory of justice in holdings, the article examines his critique of patterned and redistributive theories of justice. Nozick’s arguments are presented in their strongest form, emphasizing the moral force of self-ownership, voluntary exchange, and historical legitimacy. The article then critically assesses the limitations of the entitlement theory, particularly its treatment of background injustice, structural inequality, and constrained choice. It argues that while Nozick offers a powerful and necessary constraint on coercive state authority, his framework is insufficient as a comprehensive account of justice. The article concludes by situating Nozick’s theory as an indispensable but incomplete contribution to debates about liberty, redistribution, and moral responsibility.