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Making Death Not Quite as Bad for the One Who Dies
One popular rival to Epicureanism is deprivationism, which maintains that a person’s death at a given time is bad for her to the extent that, and because, it prevents her from having a longer life that would have been, on the whole, good. Deprivationism has the surprising implication that we can lessen how bad a person’s death is for them by changing the life they would have had if they lived longer (for example, by convincing a person’s favorite author to stop writing additional books). Some have found this possibility to be “self-defeating”; Egerstrom defends deprivationism against this objection.
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