Les expériences de pensée chez Platon (preprint)

Plato’s Thought Experiments · In this contribution, we would like to look at the presence of thought experiments in Plato, as well as their relationship to image production in general and myths in particular. To this end, and to circumscribe a very broad field of investigation, we will suggest some answers to the following questions: (i) What is a philosophical thought experiment? Since the debate on this subject is still very lively today, it will be useful to present a brief description of the issues and difficulties surrounding the notion of thought experiment in the history of philosophy; (ii) Is it possible to identify a common pattern that would indicate the presence of thought experiments in ancient philosophy?; (iii) Are there Platonic thought experiments? After having answered to the first two questions, it will be possible to introduce three criteria that should be satisfied to in order to characterize a narrative based on the use of the im- agination as a thought experiment. By applying these criteria to two Platonic pieces of fiction, we will first come up with an analysis of the most well-known Platonic thought experience, Gyges’ ring, and then relativize the identification of the image of the Cave with such a category; (iv) Is it possible to associate the notion of thought experiment with some Platonic myths? With- out entering into a specific analysis, we will suggest, by way of conclusion, that some Platonic myths could also constitute thought experiments. This contribution will seek to offer a basis for what might be a more general study of thought experiments in Plato’s philosophy.