The One is the Type of the Many

The problem of the many is a paradox, on which many candidates are individually and equally well-suited to uniquely constituting an object. In this dissertation, I defend a novel solution to the problem of the many: typism. According to typism, the object in question is constituted by the type to which the many candidates belong as tokens, rather than any of the tokens themselves. Just as it is not paradoxical to claim that “rose” is the longest word in “a rose is a rose is a rose”—despite the presence of three longest words therein—it is not paradoxical to claim that the candidate constitutes an object—despite the presence of many candidate constituters. After the introduction, I present in chapter 1 a synoptic description and defense of typism, in the process comparing it with alternative solutions. The remainder of the dissertation elaborates on key issues from this first chapter, its centerpiece. Chapter 2 provides an account of distinctively metaphysical arbitrariness, and explains why such arbitrariness occasionally—as in the problem of the many—warrants rejection. Chapter 3 clarifies the resemblance between types and their tokens which (among other things) underlies the defense of typism, specifically by appeal to the generic features of pluralities of said tokens. Chapter 4 addresses an explanatory challenge to typism—how can abstract types constitute non-abstract objects?—by outlining a model on which constitution is, in this case, a form of projection (e.g., as occurs in augmented reality technology). Finally, I conclude the dissertation by pictorially summarizing the typist’s response to the problem of the many, and pointing toward future work on the relationship between perception and metaphysical determinacy.