Dal fisicalismo al naturalismo minimale ampliato. Per un’ontologia in grado di dar conto della complessità del mentale

In the field of philosophy of mind, the issues concerning the relationship between mind and body are often approached without prior analysis of the underlying ontology. Instead of being argued based on philosophical and scientific data, the ontology is taken for granted, thus inevitably influencing subsequent theoretical analysis. Such an approach, whether employed by dualists or materialists, fails to grasp the complexity of the mental entails. The purpose of this contribution is to suggest a new ontological perspective that is both naturalistic and nonreductionistic. To this end, the article first examines the theory of property dualism and the concept of emergence and then formulates, using elements provided by these two theories, the so-called expanded minimal naturalism, which proves to be a fruitful perspective that relates empirical sciences and philosophy without falling into naturalized epistemology.