More scepticism about epistemic blame

Scepticism about epistemic blame maintains that there is no distinctly epistemic form of blame. Cameron Boult (2024a) challenges this view on the grounds that a particular theory of epistemic blame—the relationship modification account—can be defended against the sceptic. His defence includes two central claims. First, Boult proposes a pluralism in our repertoire of epistemic accountability practices that makes space for both epistemic blame and epistemic evaluation. Second, he develops a more ’sceptic-resistant’ way of articulating the phenomenon that proponents of epistemic blame believe a theory of epistemic blame is needed to explain. In my view, neither of these arguments should convince us. I argue that the epistemic blame sceptic can meet both challenges. Although my arguments largely focus on Boult’s defence of his preferred account of epistemic blame, I also set out two general problems that faces any theory of epistemic blame. The upshot is that there remain strong grounds for scepticism about epistemic blame.