The Universal Assumption Problem in Epistemology

This paper introduces and explores "The Universal Assumption Problem in Epistemology," arguing that every explanatory worldview, regardless of its specific tenets, commits the same fundamental structural error: the assumption of an entity or reality existing beyond direct experience to ground or explain experience itself. This pervasive pattern, termed the "assumption trap," inevitably leads to unprovable metaphysical commitments that generate pseudo-problems within philosophical discourse. Through a detailed pattern analysis across diverse frameworks, including religious, materialist, idealist, Platonist, and simulation theories, this paper demonstrates the identical structural move from observed experiential patterns to posited external grounds. The inevitability of this pattern is explored through the "inevitability thesis," which posits that escaping the perceived "solipsistic frame" inherently necessitates the postulation of "otherness." As an alternative, "Experiential Empiricism" is proposed, an epistemological framework that works directly with experiential patterns without recourse to metaphysical assumptions. This approach, it is argued, dissolves many traditional philosophical problems, such as the hard problem of consciousness, the problem of other minds, and the objective/subjective divide, by reframing them as artifacts of the assumption trap. The paper engages with relevant literature in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics, addressing common objections to such a non-foundationalist stance, including practical realism and the success of science. Ultimately, this meta-philosophical insight aims to identify a common error across all explanatory frameworks, advocating for a more rigorous and less metaphysically burdened empiricism.