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Hilary Putnam has long defended a position that he calls conceptual relativism. Putnam’s favorite argument for this position is his so-called “mereological argument.” Putnam’s argument has been criticized in (Raatikainen, 2001). This note reviews the central idea of this criticism. Pihlström (2006) and, implicitly, also Putnam himself (2006) have attempted to respond to this criticism. The note argues that they do not, in fact, succeed in doing so. In addition, a new argument against Putnam’s argument are presented. [This is a rough translation of a talk originally given in Finnish at the 2009 annual conference of the Philosophical Society of Finland and later published as Panu Raatikainen (2012), “Putnam, kielet ja maailmat,” in J. Kotkavirta et al. (eds.), Maailma, SoPhi, Jyväskylä, pp. 82–88.]
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