The Illusion of Permissive Balancing

The standard view among philosophers of normativity is that practical reasons balance permissively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible actions, either action is rational), while epistemic reasons balance prohibitively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible doxastic attitudes, neither attitude may be rationally formed). Those who disagree, typically epistemic permissivists, think that epistemic reasons behave like reasons for action and that all reasons exhibit permissive balancing. One thing widely agreed on is that a third possibility, that all reasons exhibit prohibitive balancing, is off the table. This paper aims to get that option back on the table. I defend the view that all reasons balance prohibitively, and the apparent permissive balancing of practical reasons is an illusion. What we take to be cases of choosing on the basis of tied practical reasons, actually involve finding extra, tie-breaking, reasons.