PhilArchive
open access
Dinamiche dell'abitudine. Inferenza, creazione e istituzione tra Hume e Bergson
This paper explores the relationship between inference, creation, and institution in the formation of habit. In the first part, drawing on Hume’s philosophy, we examine the skeptical view that inference arises more from habit than from reason. Building on this, and following Bergson’s critique of associationist theories, we argue that the habit of inferring does not result from mere mechanical attraction, but rather involves the continuous creation of general ideas and the active engagement of the spirit. In the final section, we introduce the concept of institution as a generative act that, by establishing an association—and thus a general idea—simultaneously delivers what it creates to future repetitions.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The early ontogeny of epistemic trust#161311
- Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament#720442
- Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation#720450
- Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism#82522
- Necessary Laws#745134
Record · ID 718226
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive