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Libertad y conocimiento en Spinoza. ¿Por qué el ser humano no escapa a su propia concepción del libre albedrío?
The present paper addresses a response to the question “Why does the human being not escape their own conception of free will?” from the perspective of Baruch Spinoza’s thought. For this, it presents Spinoza ́s conception of free will as inadequate knowledge, the true conception of freedom, and thus responds to the condition that prevents the human being from escaping this inadequate of freedom, which is perpetuated by the institutions in which we live with an intention of servitude.
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