Nudging: It’s Not the What, It’s the Who

There is an immense literature about the ethics of nudging. One common objection to nudging is that it violates respect for personal autonomy. This claim has been subject to strong criticisms by philosophers who think that nudging is compatible with respect for autonomy. Although that debate is still ongoing, it is worth asking what would follow if these philosophers (who think that nudging is compatible with respect for autonomy) are correct. For the sake of argument, I will assume that nudges do not undermine autonomy. With this assumption in place, we can see the fruitfulness of moving the nudge debate away from discussions of autonomy and consent. An entirely new set of questions enter the picture. If it’s true that nudges are compatible with respect for autonomy, would it follow that all nudges are permissible? Or, are there non-autonomy based reasons against nudging? I propose to answer these questions by focusing on who is doing the nudging. I argue that certain domains of life, roles, and professions come with role obligations and special duties that permit, prohibit, or even require nudges. In brief, we can make more progress on the ethics of nudging by focusing on the who, not the what of nudging. Specifically, I’ll analyze the special obligations of medical professionals, government officials, and market actors. My conclusion is that whether nudging is permissible has less to do with autonomy and much more to do with whether one’s specific role charges one with duties of beneficence or neutrality toward others. For example, I'll argue that doctors are often morally required to nudge, as they have a duty to advance the wellbeing of their patients, while government officials in liberal democracies are often prohibited from nudging, as they are charged with neutrality toward the good, and nudging often runs afoul of neutrality. This shifts the debate about nudges away from a focus on autonomy and instead to the various roles that we occupy. This leaves us with a picture of the ethics of nudging according to which nudging is sometimes permissible, sometimes prohibited, and even sometimes required, based on the roles we occupy in public and private life, not based on respect for autonomy.