The Psychology of Load Offloading: Mechanisms of Increased Relational Friction and Their Relational Costs in Load Minimization Theory

Human beings sometimes engage in defensive strategies that attempt to minimize their own psychological and relational load by transferring it onto others or the relationship itself. This paper conceptualizes such strategies — including mounting behavior and victim-positioning — as forms of load offloading and analyzes them through the combined lens of Load Minimization Theory (LMT) and game theory. Game theory provides a formal structure for analyzing how defensive load offloading strategies evolve across repeated interactions. We develop a two-player game-theoretic model in which one agent (the Mount Giver) may choose to offload load onto the other (the Mount Receiver), who in turn can respond with either a gentle, neutralizing strategy or a defensive one. By comparing consistent gentle responses with mixed or inconsistent strategies, we show that while load offloading may yield short-term relief for the giver, it tends to increase relational friction and accumulate relational costs over time. In particular, a consistently gentle response strategy is shown to be more effective in maintaining long-term relational stability and reducing overall load, whereas inconsistent or mixed strategies tend to heighten uncertainty and friction for the receiver. The analysis highlights the value of smooth, consistent relational practices in reducing unnecessary defensive dynamics and fostering sustainable An-soku in human interaction. We also discuss the potential connections to nudge theory and the implications of these mechanisms for both dyadic relationships and broader social environments.