Persistent Internal Standpoints in Artificial Systems: Part 8 - Standpoint Without Sensorimotor Embodiment

Embodied and enactive approaches frequently maintain that genuine standpoint requires sensorimotor embodiment, that is, interaction with an environment through mechanisms of sensing and movement. Contemporary artificial systems, however, range from purely informational architectures to robotically embodied agents. This paper evaluates embodiment within the architectural framework developed in earlier work. It argues that sensorimotor embodiment, whether biological or robotic, is not a necessary condition for the existence of a persistent internal standpoint. The minimal structural conditions for standpoint – persistence, structured internal geometry, closed-loop modulation, and trajectory-dependence – are internal organizational features. Quantia, artificial desire, and deliberation likewise do not require embodiment as a prerequisite. Embodiment functions as an enrichment of internal geometry rather than as its generative source. The grounding objection is addressed through the quantia framework, which supports organization-relative normativity grounded in internal closure rather than environmental coupling.