Covert Value Judgments in Expert Testimony

Scientific experts frequently say things that encode value judgments, not least when they are called on to offer advice or recommendations. Often, however, the value judgments underlying their testimony are tacit or covert. This paper explores the problems that covert value judgments in expert testimony pose for the practice of deference to experts, which occurs when a layperson believes an expert’s testimony on their say-so. Many philosophers (and others) have suggested that laypeople ought to defer to experts a lot more than they do. But, I will argue, this advice can be problematic when value judgments are involved, since scientific experts often have no special authority with respect to these value judgments. I illustrate this with reference to a range of cases, with particular focus on policy during the COVID pandemic. My aim is not to argue that we should never defer to experts, but to raise to prominence a complication for its rationality in many cases, which suggests that our public discourse about deference to experts is often too coarse. I conclude with some reflections on how experts can be appropriately cognizant of the problem in issuing testimony, and in so doing, make this testimony more worthy of deference.