La division dans la _Métaphysique_ d’Aristote

If the Aristotelian division has above all an epistemic and heuristic purpose, this article aims to examine the ontological appropriation of division by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, too often neglected by secondary literature. Division is also an ontological operation, insofar it governs the relationship between the eidos (which is identified, in the context of the central books of the Metaphysics, with the primary substance, i.e. what is properly speaking), its genus and the final differentia of this genus. More precisely, we will show that division is a case of the hylemorphic relation: the genus is an (intelligible) matter to which the final differentia obtained by division is predicated, and which then acts as the formal cause of this genus being such a determined eidos. However, this ontological and hylemorphic dimension of Aristotelian division is largely compatible with its methodological use.