Pyrrhonian Equilibrism

Bernáth and Tőzsér investigate doxastic equilibrism, according to which the primary aim of philosophy is to develop philosophical theories that are in equilibrium with our core beliefs, and the authors examine how this view can be defended against a skeptical challenge based on the argument from disagreement. They reconstruct the standard defense strategy, which is excuse-based. According to this strategy, one need not suspend one’s core beliefs or the philosophical theories grounded in them, because either no one is genuinely able to do so, or doing so would involve an excessively great sacrifice with too many negative consequences. After reconstructing this standard strategy, the authors propose an alternative approach based on transcendentally protected propositions. Unlike other core beliefs, it can be transparently shown that beliefs in transcendentally protected propositions cannot violate inescapable epistemic obligations. Consequently, unlike other core beliefs appealed to by doxastic equilibrism, maintaining such beliefs does not risk making one an epistemic bad guy by ignoring the skeptical imperative. In this sense, Bernáth and Tőzsér propose a Pyrrhonian doxastic equilibrism that even the skeptic—who otherwise demands the suspension of all beliefs lacking sufficient evidence—can reasonably maintain. They argue that this form of doxastic equilibrism, which remains reasonable to hold even for the skeptic, resists skepticism far more effectively than the standard excuse-based version.