Having Normative Practical Reasons

This dissertation investigates the nature of reason-possession, a topic that has received significant attention in recent philosophical literature. Existing discussions often center on a key puzzle: How can false beliefs appear to provide agents with reasons to act, making them rationally responsible for forming intentions based on these beliefs? This puzzle highlights a potential tension between the objective sense of reasons, understood as facts tied to the rational advisability of actions, and the subjective sense of reasons, grounded in an agent's rational criticizability. I offer a solution to this puzzle by introducing the Multifactorial Account (MA) of having normative practical reasons, developed through critiques of the extant Factoring Account and Two Relations Account. MA describes reason-possession as a state of mind where a person comes under a requirement of rationality—what I call the Practical Entailment Requirement (PER). Unlike the Instrumental Requirement, which has been traditionally invoked to explain normative conditions in instrumental reasoning, PER provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how attitudes generate rational options and determine the reasons agents have in practical reasoning. I argue that coming under an instance of PER explains why propositions— whether true or false—like or , can serve as an agent’s reasons when the agent is in a position to justifiably believe or intend to make them true. Ultimately, this dissertation aims to advance a deeper understanding of the relationship between practical reasoning and rational responsibility. Reason-possession, I contend, must be understood as integral to episodes of practical reasoning, shaped by a person’s attitudes and the normative demands of rationality.