When the old answer forecloses thinking again: weak retention of prior conclusions as a structural precondition for re-derivative cognition

A familiar observation in cognitive psychology is that effortful re-engagement with material can produce deeper learning than passive re-reading. A related observation in aesthetic theory is that defamiliarization can make familiar objects perceptible again. I argue that these observations point to a stronger possibility: in some domains, retaining one’s previous conclusion too strongly can prevent fresh re-engagement. I call the relevant faculty re-derivative cognition: the ability to return to a problem or text and derive a fresh approach rather than simply retrieve one’s prior answer. The paper distinguishes fact-cache, the retention of declarative material, from solution-cache, the retention of prior conclusions that return with answer-status. Fact-cache usually supports inquiry; solution-cache can foreclose it, the mechanism I call foreclosure-by-cache. Drawing on work on fixation, Einstellung, retrieval-induced forgetting, desirable difficulties, and defamiliarization, I argue that weak solution-cache may be a structural precondition for re-derivative cognition in fresh-encounter domains. It is structural because the very techniques meant to loosen a prior conclusion must themselves be chosen, and that choice can be governed by the prior conclusion in turn, so effort alone cannot be relied on to overcome it. The resulting asymmetry is domain-specific: strong solution-cache is valuable where the prior answer is exactly what is wanted, but obstructive where the task requires the problem to be seen again.