Fixed-Point Constraint Pragmatism: Evaluation Without Correspondence

This paper derives an epistemological position, Fixed-Point Constraint Pragmatism (FPCP), from the metaphysics of continuous dual-aspect panexperiential monism (CDAPM). Removing the discrete-unit assumption from the ontology of consciousness removes the discrete relatum that correspondence semantics requires, and a self-sufficient account of correctness follows without appeal to any mind-independent correctness-making layer. Correctness is characterized as fixed-point stability under admissible extension, where admissibility is fixed jointly by three criteria: coherence, utility, and morality. A constructive removal argument shows these three to be independently necessary, each blocking a distinct failure mode the other two cannot. The position is located in relation to Kant, neopragmatism, and ontic structural realism, and is extended to the science/fiction distinction, mathematical and logical necessity, and modality. Each of the latter topics is treated as internal to constraint-closure rather than grounded outside it. FPCP is presented as one component of a broader framework originating in the same foundational move.