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Testimony and Interpretation
Testimony can be a source of knowledge. This paper examines how misinterpretation, or the risk of it, can prevent a hearer from acquiring testimonial knowledge. Because unreliability in interpretation can arise in many ways, section 2 considers a variety of such cases. Section 3 sketches some desiderata for a successful account of the role of interpretation in testimony, by analogous consideration of inference. On our account, interpretation needn’t proceed inferentially through knowledgeable belief about what is said. Finally, section 4 offers a safety-theoretic account of reliable interpretation which explains how and when misinterpretation prevents knowledge.
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