The Antinomies and Pyrrhonism

In this short paper, I make the case that Kant did not hold the adversarial view of Pyrrhonian skepticism which has sometimes been attributed to him. I show that Kant’s critical method in the Critique of Pure Reason, rather than competing with the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical method to find a more satisfying solution to pure reason’s internal conflicts, instead works alongside the skeptical method to produce a mutually agreeable resolution to the disputes of pure reason, and that this resolution turns out to be far more Pyrrhonian than Kant initially lets on. I begin by piecing together Kant’s interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism (referred to here as "mitigated Pyrrhonism"), which he sees as a moderate form of skepticism that does not aim to undermine the possibility of knowledge or certainty in general and that concedes that we often have adequate reason to stop suspending judgment and endorse a belief over another incompatible belief. I then show that Kant’s critical method in the Antinomies is not meant to provide a general refutation of Pyrrhonian skeptical arguments from equipollence. Instead, it offers a tacit endorsement of the mitigated Pyrrhonist’s procedure as both a method for identifying the limits of human knowledge and a means of attaining knowledge within those limits. The larger project, of which this represents only the first piece, aims to offer a comprehensive Pyrrhonian reading of Kant's critical philosophy which uses the account offered here as its foundation.