Many-Worlds Is the Simplest Interpretation: An Algorithmic Argument

The Many-Worlds Interpretation adds nothing to the Schrödinger equation. Collapse interpretations add non-unitary processes; hidden-variable theories add unobservable particles and pilot waves. I argue this difference in descriptive complexity has ontological consequences. Under algorithmic probability-the Solomonoff prior extended from epistemology to ontology-interpretations with lower Kolmogorov complexity dominate the measure over physical theories. Many-Worlds, requiring only unitary evolution, has minimal K and is therefore most probable. This transforms "MWI is simpler" from aesthetic preference to measure-theoretic claim. The argument rests on establishing that reality is mathematical structure via an exhaustive pattern-randomness dichotomy, then showing that algorithmic probability provides the natural measure over structure-space. Bell correlations, rather than posing puzzles about nonlocality, become structural features of unified mathematical objects. The position explains why simpler physical theories tend to be true: they describe higher-measure structures.