Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism: Truth, Empirical Adequacy, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge

This study examines the philosophical dialogue between scientific realism and constructive empiricism, focusing on their competing interpretations of scientific theories, truth, empirical adequacy, and the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. The central aim is to clarify how each position understands the epistemic status of science and the extent to which scientific theories may be said to describe reality. The analysis begins with the realist claim that successful scientific theories are not merely useful instruments but are approximately true descriptions of a mind-independent world. In this context, key realist arguments are considered, including the No-Miracles Argument and Inference to the Best Explanation, both of which attempt to explain the success of science by appealing to the truth or approximate truth of theories. The study then turns to Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, according to which the aim of science is not truth as such but empirical adequacy—that is, the capacity of a theory to “save the phenomena.” Particular attention is given to van Fraassen’s distinction between the observable and the unobservable, his semantic conception of theories, and his critique of metaphysical inflation in scientific realism. The concluding sections offer a critical comparison of the two positions and argue that the enduring tension between them reveals a deeper philosophical problem: how science can remain both epistemically responsible and ontologically meaningful in its interpretation of reality.