Why Actual-Sequence Compatibilists Should Also Be Leeway Compatibilists

The "flicker of freedom" defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) continues to challenge Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs). Flickers are often assumed to entail indeterminism, and thus to conflict with compatibilist theories of moral responsibility. This paper argues that a refined version of the flicker strategy-one appealing to weak, non-robust, fine-grained alternative possibilities-is not mutually exclusive to compatibilism, and thus does not obviously require indeterminism. Drawing on Vihvelin's dispositional account of ability, I show that agents in FSCs retain a compatibilist form of leeway that remains both morally relevant and immune to determinism. Specifically, I argue that such leeway is morally relevant insofar as it indicates an agent's exercise of agency in the actual sequence, thereby verifying rather than competing with the sourcehood condition on moral responsibility. I term this view Wide Source Compatibilism: a compatibilist account that preserves the insights of both leeway and actual-sequence theories. Therefore, actual-sequence compatibilists should also endorse a form of leeway compatibilism. The result is a more resilient compatibilism, one in which leeway strengthens, rather than undermines, the actual sequence.