Отображение мира в семантике

To what in reality do true logically simple sentences with empirical content correspond? Two extreme positions can be distinguished in this regard: ‘Great Fact’ theories, such as are defended by Davidson; and trope-theories, which see such sentences being made true simply by those events or states to which the relevant main verbs correspond. A position midway between these two extremes is defended, one according to which sentences of the given sort are made true by what are called ‘dependence structures’, or in other words by certain complex concrete portions of reality between the parts of which relations of dependence are defined. Principles governing such dependence-structures are laid down, principles of an ontologically motivated sort which serve as basis for a “topological semantics” conceived as an alternative to standard set-theoretic approaches to semantics of the Tarskian sort. These principles are then used to resolve certain puzzles generated by the (semantically motivated) theory of events put forward by Davidson