PhilArchive
open access
Mesh Theories and Acting Rationally (2023)
In this paper, I consider the mesh theory of Frankfurt that moral responsibility is assessed by a meshing of first-order desires and second-order volitions. I come to argue that these second-order volitions are our rational decision-making process, and should be praised or blamed on the basis of that volition and whether the agent acted according to it.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Free will and moral responsibility, reactive and objective attitudes#719371
- Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities#777090
- The Source of Responsibility#696444
- The Narrative of Moral Responsibility#746957
- Dual-Ledger Transactionalism: Objective Effects and Subjective Verdicts#88575
Record · ID 724088
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive