The Atheist’s Modal Trilemma

In certain reasoned arguments against God's existence, atheists sometimes argue that its possible that God could do (....) X (some possible deed). Both the atheists claim possibly God could do ◇X and it is possible a Maximally Great Being (MGB) exists ◇M are both logically symmetrical in structure. The atheist will often affirm the typical properties of God to critique the very notion of God and use possible world semantics to say what God could do, yet will equally dismiss the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA) as questionable. My paper will deploy a potentially novel offensive strategy, that undermines a central claim atheists use when arguing against God's existence. I will argue that using possible world semantics, inadvertently commits the atheist to a trilemma, which ultimately either affirms God's existence, forcing them to show why ◇M is incoherent or forces the atheist to abandon their original claims.