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Phenomenology Without Context: A Critical Review of Mabaquiao on Husserl’s Intentionality
The article is an analysis on how Husserl forms the theory of intentionality, that is a foundational theory in philosophy which investigates the essential character of consciousness. It can be defined as every consciousness is consciousness of something, that is every mental act is directed towards or about some object that may exist or not. The mental act or intentional act refers to the mode of consciousness, such as perceiving, imagining, or remembering, are always directed towards something, and we cannot imagine consciousness independent from an intentional object. The intentional object is the entity towards which consciousness is always related to in various mental acts.
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