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The Exhaustion of Rationality: A Cognitive-Philosophical Critique of the Rational Thinking Bias and Its Implications for Mental Vitality
Rationality has long been celebrated as the defining faculty of human cognition, grounding philosophy, science, and everyday judgment. Yet the persistence of rational thinking as a normative ideal conceals its psychological and existential costs. This paper develops a cross-disciplinary critique—philosophical and cognitive—of what I call the rational thinking bias: the systemic overextension of analytic cognition beyond its adaptive domain. I argue that this bias produces two interrelated pathologies: (1) an epistemic loop of over-refinement and skepticism, and (2) a state of cognitive over-sensitivity that erodes mental vitality. Drawing upon cognitive science, phenomenology, and meta-philosophy, I construct the Rational Exhaustion Hypothesis (REH): the proposition that long-term dominance of analytic cognition leads to an internal feedback loop of vigilance, doubt, and depletion, constraining the integrative and creative dimensions of mind. The paper situates this hypothesis within historical critiques of reason, from Kant’s antinomies to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and extends it with insights from dual-process theory, predictive coding, and metacognitive research. Ultimately, I propose a reconfiguration of rationality as a dynamic equilibrium between analytic constraint and cognitive openness—a model that reconciles the philosophical critique of reason with contemporary cognitive architecture.
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