Classical Theism and Universalism II: Reply to Rooney

I make four points about Rooney’s (2026) reply to Hill (2025). First, Rooney worries that universalists cannot ground the claim that necessarily God beatifies every creature He makes. I explain how universalists can ground the relevant claim in a claim Rooney endorses in his book. Second, Rooney’s argument depends on the principle that if a property is not essential to a creature, then God cannot ensure that necessarily that creature eventually gets that property. I point out that Rooney offers no motivation for this principle and so it may be costlessly rejected by the universalist. I further explain that if atheism is true Rooney’s principle might be plausible. But, if God exists, it is easy to construct counterexamples to the principle. Third, Rooney’s argument depends on a specific, contentious interpretation of Aquinas’ understanding of the Beatific Vision. Rooney says this is acceptable because his universalist opponents also accept this understanding of the Beatific Vision. But I point out that many paradigm examples of universalists, as well as non-universalist Classical Theists, explicitly reject not only Rooney’s specific formulation but also the Thomistic understanding of the Beatific Vision more generally. This confirms that even if Rooney’s argument were not unsound for the other reasons I have identified, it would nevertheless depend on Rooney’s specific, contentious understanding of deliverances of Revelation. But the main purpose of Rooney’s argument was to convince Classical Theists who are not moved by appeals to Revelation. So Rooney’s argument doesn’t do the main thing it is advertised as doing. Fourth, Rooney claims that Hill was nonchalant about the possibility of abandoning Classical Theism. I point out that this is a misreading of Hill. Nowhere does Hill advocate abandoning Classical Theism. Instead, Hill maintains that Rooney’s argument gives the Classical Theist no reason to reject universalism.