Normative Quality as a Condition of Moral Judgment

This paper develops an epistemically grounded argument concerning the con- ditions of normative assessment under interpersonal mediation. Its starting point is the observation that normative assessments involving multiple perspectives are subject to structural epistemic conditions that systematically limit their reach and justiability. In four steps it is shown: that interpersonal judgment under epistemic distance becomes recursive and grows in underdetermination; that structural asymmetry and scaling disproportionately worsen the conditions of interpersonal justiability; that from these conditions a content-neutral dimension of normative quality can be de- rived, functioning as a condition of moral judgment; and that this condition places on institutions a constitutive obligation toward constructive self-dissolution. The argument introduces no external values. Its normative content arises per- formatively in the very act of engaging with it as an argument. A closing remark sketches the transferability of the argumentative structure to further elds of inter- personally mediated inquiry. This is the Translation of the German original "Normative Qualität als Bedingung moralischer Beurteilung"