The Perils of Epistemic Idealism

I argue that philosophers are vulnerable to an occupational hazard that I call ‘epistemic idealism.’ This is the assumption that a practice in our epistemic lives with harmful political consequences is best made sense of as the outcome of false beliefs and the attendant assumption that we should primarily address the practice and associated problems by correcting those beliefs. Epistemic idealism can often lead to misunderstanding the target practice, obscure better material explanations, and produce misguided solutions that risk exacerbating harms. I develop my account of epistemic idealism by analyzing philosophical discussion of the balance norm in US journalism – the principle that equal representation for different sides in a politically contentious dispute is crucial. Philosophers have argued that this norm is mistaken, even disastrously so, and is a product of journalists’ well-intentioned but false beliefs regarding the nature of balance. I argue that these accounts misdiagnose why such norms exist. Modern journalistic norms arose primarily as a defensive measure by private owners of media to thwart increased public oversight and public alternatives to for-profit media. These philosophical accounts therefore represent illustrative examples of epistemic idealism and its shortcomings. I then point to broader lessons for non-ideal epistemology.