Liberty, Harm, and the Limits of Social Authority in John Stuart Mill

This article reconstructs and critically evaluates John Stuart Mill’s defense of liberty in On Liberty, focusing on his arguments for freedom of expression and the harm principle as limits on social and political authority. Mill’s case for free speech is grounded in human fallibility, the epistemic value of dissent, and the necessity of contestation for sustaining meaningful belief. His harm principle extends these concerns to conduct, restricting coercive interference to the prevention of harm to others and rejecting paternalism and moralism as bases for compulsion. The article argues that these arguments form a unified, instrumental theory of liberty aimed at preserving the conditions of moral agency and social progress. At the same time, it contends that Mill’s framework presupposes relatively just background conditions and struggles to address indirect, cumulative, and structurally produced harms. Rather than undermining Mill’s project, these limitations clarify its proper role as a foundational constraint on power rather than a comprehensive theory of justice. The article concludes by inviting continued critical engagement with Mill’s arguments, emphasizing that liberty, properly understood, demands ongoing scrutiny and revision rather than doctrinal closure.