What Is Meaning? An Analysis of the Naiyāyika-Prābhākara Debate

What is the meaning of ‘cow’ in a sentence like “Nala is bringing one cow”? Does ‘meaning’ encompass the reference within a specific context or what a competent language user comprehends across various contexts? This paper reconstructs and evaluates the debate between Gaṅgeśa (a 14th-century Nyāya philosopher) and the Prābhākaras regarding their responses to these questions as presented in Gaṅgeśa’s The Jewel of Reflection on the Nature of Things (Tattvacintāmaṇi). Gaṅgeśa defends a two-level semantic account involving contextual meaning and general meaning: the meaning of ‘cow’ in a context where Nala is bringing Betsy is Betsy characterized by cowness, while the general meaning of ‘cow’ that remains consistent across contexts is an underspecified individual characterized by cowness. In contrast, the Prābhākaras maintain that ‘cow’ means solely cowness, irrespective of context. I argue that the Prābhākaras and Gaṅgeśa’s accounts converge functionally in requiring both universal and individual aspects, revealing a tension inherent to what I call ‘entity-based theories’—theories of meaning that attempt to maintain alignment between cognitive content and references across contexts. Their crucial divergence regarding where to draw the boundary of word meaning proper stems not only from semantic considerations, but also from competing priorities concerning verbal utterances as a source of knowledge.